John Morales has made the comment that Christianity has a record for committing mass killings and genocide’s. This is one of the Atheists favorite arguments against Religion, assuming that Religion is the cause of most wars. It is true that both sides have committed acts that are clearly wrong, but the record is held by Atheists.
You may want to look at Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod in their massive 1502 page 3-volume encyclopedia of war. It is compiled by nine reputable professors of history, including the director of the centre of military history and the former head of the centre for defence studies. They conclude that from what we know from history there have been about 1763 wars and only 123 have been over religion. This makes religion 6.98 percent accountable. If you take away the wars from Mulisms it drops down to 3.23 percent.
I dont think the evidence proves that religion is the cause of war or mass murdering.
Here is another source from “Stand to Reason”
A blight on Christianity? Certainty. Something wrong? Dismally wrong. A tragedy? Of course. Millions and millions of people killed? No. The numbers are tragic, but pale in comparison to the statistics of what non-religion criminals have committed.
My point is not that Christians or religious people aren’t vulnerable to committing terrible crimes. Certainly they are. But it is not religion that produces these things; it is the denial of Biblical religion that generally leads to these kinds of things. The statistics that are the result of irreligious genocide stagger the imagination.
My source is The Guinness Book of World Records . Look up the category “Judicial” and under the subject of “Crimes: Mass Killings,” the greatest massacre ever imputed by the government of one sovereign against the government of another is 26.3 million Chinese during the regime of Mao Tse Tung between the years of 1949 and May 1965. The Walker Report published by the U.S. Senate Committee of the Judiciary in July 1971 placed the parameters of the total death toll in China since 1949 between 32 and 61.7 million people. An estimate of 63.7 million was published by Figaro magazine on November 5, 1978.
In the U.S.S.R. the Nobel Prize winner, Alexander Solzhenitsyn estimates the loss of life from state repression and terrorism from October 1917 to December 1959 under Lenin and Stalin and Khrushchev at 66.7 million.
Finally, in Cambodia (and this was close to me because I lived in Thailand in 1982 working with the broken pieces of the Cambodian holocaust from 1975 to 1979) “as a percentage of a nation’s total population, the worst genocide appears to be that in Cambodia, formerly Kampuchea. According to the Khmer Rouge foreign minister, more than one third of the eight million Khmer were killed between April 17, 1975 and January 1979. One third of the entire country was put to death under the rule of Pol Pot, the founder of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. During that time towns, money and property were abolished. Economic execution by bayonet and club was introduced for such offenses as falling asleep during the day, asking too many questions, playing non-communist music, being old and feeble, being the offspring of an undesirable, or being too well educated. In fact, deaths in the Tuol Sleng interrogation center in Phnom Penh, which is the capitol of Kampuchea, reached 582 in a day.”
Then in Chinese history of the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries there were three periods of wholesale massacre. The numbers of victims attributed to these events are assertions rather than reliable estimates. The figures put on the Mongolian invasion of northern China form 1210 to 1219 and from 1311 to 1340 are both on the order of 35 million people. While the number of victims of bandit leader Chang Hsien-Chung, known as the Yellow Tiger, from 1643 to 1647 in the Szechwan province has been put at 40 million people.
China under Mao Tse Tung, 26.3 million Chinese. According the Walker Report, 63.7 million over the whole period of time of the Communist revolution in China. Solzhenitsyn says the Soviet Union put to death 66.7 million people. Kampuchea destroyed one third of their entire population of eight million Cambodians. The Chinese at two different times in medieval history, somewhere in the vicinity of 35 million and 40 million people. Ladies and gentlemen, make note that these deaths were the result of organizations or points of view or ideologies that had left God out of the equation. None of these involve religion. And all but the very last actually assert atheism.
I think I could even find more…
Saturday, March 29, 2008
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Atheist's and the Golden Rule!
Atheists assume that it is easy to see what ‘goodness’ is and so they think there is no reasons on earth why we need God to know it. For them goodness is based on the Golden rule “Do on to others what you would like done to your self’. It may be one thing to say it’s easy to see the statement is true, but it is another to state that our actions are in fact good. The History of Atheism shows that they have struggled to see what Goodness is as they are accountable for most of the mass killings and genocide’s in the world. Atheism has killed more people than Religion. Also if it is so easy to see what is the good, why is it taking so long for the human race to live it out. It seems strange that Jesus didn’t spend years debating with the philosophers of his age what was good and useful for mankind. No he just spoke the perfect ethics into being from the Fathers heart and Character.
I’m afraid Atheists that it is not that easy to just try and pinch Christianity's objective perfect morality and throw away God.
Vox Day makes a good point in his book “The Irrational Atheist”
“It is often asserted that Christian morality is no different than other ethical systems that are based on the Golden rule. And it is true that one can find pre-Christian examples of the same concepts in the Analects of Confucius, in the Mahabharata, the Dhammapada, the Udanavarga, and even in the histories of Herodotus.”
But the problem with this attack, that all people can see what the good is , and that it is not based on Christian morality is that Christianity’s morality is not just based on the Golden rule, which states that man should not do to others what he would not have them do to him. It is based on doing the Fathers perfect (God’s) will. But just stating the above cannot provide us with a functional moral system.
Obviously a moral system based on loving the Lord your God and obediently submitting your will to his is a very different moral system and far more objective one than the Golden rule, which is not only entirely subjective, but incapable of accounting for either rational calculation or human psychopathy. It provides no moral basis to criticize a man for crawling into Adriana’s bed unannounced so long as he harbors no desire to bar her from doing the same to him, and sanctions a thief to steal on the grounds of a belief that he wouldn’t miss that which was stolen were the thief himself the prospective victim. The Golden rule is also to easily transformed into the idea of doing unto others as you believe they wish to do unto you.
The problem still is, What is “Right”? what is “Good”. As Cleeray says, there is no ontological nature of goodness, it just is what we think other people wouldn’t mind. It just seems strange that Jesus’ ethics do not injure any one but promotes complete peace and atheist's are still trying to iron out the few mistakes in there concepts so that we can all get along. It just seems that millions have to be murdered first to get the system working.
I’m afraid Atheists that it is not that easy to just try and pinch Christianity's objective perfect morality and throw away God.
Vox Day makes a good point in his book “The Irrational Atheist”
“It is often asserted that Christian morality is no different than other ethical systems that are based on the Golden rule. And it is true that one can find pre-Christian examples of the same concepts in the Analects of Confucius, in the Mahabharata, the Dhammapada, the Udanavarga, and even in the histories of Herodotus.”
But the problem with this attack, that all people can see what the good is , and that it is not based on Christian morality is that Christianity’s morality is not just based on the Golden rule, which states that man should not do to others what he would not have them do to him. It is based on doing the Fathers perfect (God’s) will. But just stating the above cannot provide us with a functional moral system.
Obviously a moral system based on loving the Lord your God and obediently submitting your will to his is a very different moral system and far more objective one than the Golden rule, which is not only entirely subjective, but incapable of accounting for either rational calculation or human psychopathy. It provides no moral basis to criticize a man for crawling into Adriana’s bed unannounced so long as he harbors no desire to bar her from doing the same to him, and sanctions a thief to steal on the grounds of a belief that he wouldn’t miss that which was stolen were the thief himself the prospective victim. The Golden rule is also to easily transformed into the idea of doing unto others as you believe they wish to do unto you.
The problem still is, What is “Right”? what is “Good”. As Cleeray says, there is no ontological nature of goodness, it just is what we think other people wouldn’t mind. It just seems strange that Jesus’ ethics do not injure any one but promotes complete peace and atheist's are still trying to iron out the few mistakes in there concepts so that we can all get along. It just seems that millions have to be murdered first to get the system working.
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Responding to John Morales
I deciding to post my recent posting, titled “Nature and Convention” on an Atheist Web site called www.mycaseagainstgod.blogspot.com. I thought I would do this to see what response I would get to my argument. One thinker by the name of “John Morales” responded and I’m not sure by his words if he thinks my post is good or if he is taking the Mickey of me. But for one thing he thinks that I am close to making a contradiction in my thinking. So it is this claim that I will be responding to. For some it might be wise to re-read my post…
John Morales wrote,
Interesting rant, Richard.
How's it go?
"If one wants to be a true atheist and live according to true morality, then he must live according to nature"..."The law of nature is basically the law of anarchy. Rape, murder, lust, greed is all part of our nature. This is what our nature desires"..."The problem with the atheist is that a godless universe is a goodness free and evil free world"..."Our minds just know deep down that something’s are wrong no matter what people views are on it".
Wow. You may be undermining your strawman with a contradiction, but you sure know how to project.
I think John is hinting that if I am making the case “that all our desires are part of nature” then aren’t the desires that feel that some things are just right and wrong independent of peoples opinions just desires from our nature. So what is my point, aren’t I just saying that objective morality is part of nature as well. So in fact my strawman to refute the atheists foundation for morality is basically refuting my own evidence. But I don’t think this is the case and I don’t think my argument is a contradiction. John is right, it would be a contradiction “if” I assumed the atheist’s worldview, but I don’t. There is a great difference between the two worldviews. Atheism’s “true” morality is basically just what “is” and my Christian foundation is that morality is not what “is” but what we “ought” to do and our human nature is inherently good but fallen, which is very different form the worldview of atheism that says our nature just “is”. It hasn’t been made or created to act good, but just according to what it does and feels.
I also think the atheist’s argument fails for a number of reasons,
1.If objective morality theories were just part of our nature, then it would be just another desire among millions of subjective choices one can choose. If this is the case then its claims have no more power or worth greater than any other.
2. From an atheist worldview there is no moral law written on our hearts, our inner being dose not have knowledge of goodness according to our inherent ontological good nature. So is left with intuition reasoning upon random blind choices.
3. Atheist also can’t defend Objective morality independent of human beings, which Michael Martin tries to do. It is one thing to have a knowledge of a good moral subjective theory, but to state it is objective independent of people assumes that it exists somewhere out there and this is the question we need answered, “Where is this standard located”? If it is not part of objective reality then it is just an invention. Can Martin’s or the atheist give us a foundation for these claims, I think not. Morality exists in moral beings, not impersonal parts of matter or atoms floating around in space.
4. Living for the good is also meaningless if there is no such thing as an ontological foundation for human dignity and worth. Responsibility is meaningless without a good nature that seeks an absolute standard of goodness.
5. Also in an atheist worldview, is the ‘good’ good because one says its good or is the act good because it corresponds to what is ontologically good?
The reason why the atheist knows right from wrong, is because he is made in the image of God with his laws written on their hearts.
John Morales wrote,
Interesting rant, Richard.
How's it go?
"If one wants to be a true atheist and live according to true morality, then he must live according to nature"..."The law of nature is basically the law of anarchy. Rape, murder, lust, greed is all part of our nature. This is what our nature desires"..."The problem with the atheist is that a godless universe is a goodness free and evil free world"..."Our minds just know deep down that something’s are wrong no matter what people views are on it".
Wow. You may be undermining your strawman with a contradiction, but you sure know how to project.
I think John is hinting that if I am making the case “that all our desires are part of nature” then aren’t the desires that feel that some things are just right and wrong independent of peoples opinions just desires from our nature. So what is my point, aren’t I just saying that objective morality is part of nature as well. So in fact my strawman to refute the atheists foundation for morality is basically refuting my own evidence. But I don’t think this is the case and I don’t think my argument is a contradiction. John is right, it would be a contradiction “if” I assumed the atheist’s worldview, but I don’t. There is a great difference between the two worldviews. Atheism’s “true” morality is basically just what “is” and my Christian foundation is that morality is not what “is” but what we “ought” to do and our human nature is inherently good but fallen, which is very different form the worldview of atheism that says our nature just “is”. It hasn’t been made or created to act good, but just according to what it does and feels.
I also think the atheist’s argument fails for a number of reasons,
1.If objective morality theories were just part of our nature, then it would be just another desire among millions of subjective choices one can choose. If this is the case then its claims have no more power or worth greater than any other.
2. From an atheist worldview there is no moral law written on our hearts, our inner being dose not have knowledge of goodness according to our inherent ontological good nature. So is left with intuition reasoning upon random blind choices.
3. Atheist also can’t defend Objective morality independent of human beings, which Michael Martin tries to do. It is one thing to have a knowledge of a good moral subjective theory, but to state it is objective independent of people assumes that it exists somewhere out there and this is the question we need answered, “Where is this standard located”? If it is not part of objective reality then it is just an invention. Can Martin’s or the atheist give us a foundation for these claims, I think not. Morality exists in moral beings, not impersonal parts of matter or atoms floating around in space.
4. Living for the good is also meaningless if there is no such thing as an ontological foundation for human dignity and worth. Responsibility is meaningless without a good nature that seeks an absolute standard of goodness.
5. Also in an atheist worldview, is the ‘good’ good because one says its good or is the act good because it corresponds to what is ontologically good?
The reason why the atheist knows right from wrong, is because he is made in the image of God with his laws written on their hearts.
Monday, March 17, 2008
The Euthyphro Argument fails!
When it comes to establishing absolute moral standards in God, atheist continue to use the Euthuphro argument to try and trap God and discredit his standard for goodness. The Euthyphro dilemma raised by Socrates was: "Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" Atheist are quick to see that if what is good is based on what God commands then anything that God commands even if it was rape would by logic be good. So atheist imply that for god to be good there must be an independent moral standard of “Goodness” that judges God actions.
John Frame says in his book “The Doctrine of God”
“So Plato, in Euthyphro, poses the question of whether piety is what the gods say it is, or whether the gods command piety because of its intrinsic nature, apart from their own wishes. In Plato’s mind, the former makes the nature of piety arbitrary, one that could change on the whim of a god. But the second alternative, which Plato certainly prefers, means that piety is independent of the will of the gods, something to which the gods opinions are subject.”
Atheists like this so called trap because to stop God having relative standards there must be an eternal abstract standard that judges God’s acts. They like it because even if there were no God, there would still be an objective standard by which atheists can establish objective morality.
The Atheist Philosopher Michael Martin says,
“For example, suppose God condemns rape because of his just and merciful character. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and action based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.”
So Martin wonders why the non-existence of God would adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice.
The problem with this argument is that ‘goodness” is not based on what ever God says. Goodness is the eternal nature of God and God is bound by his perfect nature to act “good”. God would not command people to rape or torture people because it is against his perfect nature. If God is the eternal uncaused cause of everything else that exist then he is the eternal source for moral goodness, which everything else takes its existence from.
Paul Copan makes a good point when he says,
“The "reasons" Martin offers for why rape is wrong already assume the dignity of human beings, the existence of universal human rights, an objective purpose/end for human existence, moral obligation, and moral responsibility. Thus Martin needs to offer a more robust explanation for these assumptions, but we have seen that the atheistic worldview lacks such resources while the theistic perspective anticipates a moral universe.”
In fact the very argument can be reversed back on to the atheist, for if objective moral properties just exist out in the universe independent of humans , then are they good because they are good or is there some independent standard of good to which they conform?" Thus the alleged dilemma Martin claims the theist faces is the very same one the atheist does. So there is no actual advantage for the atheist in presenting this challenge. The same potential charges of arbitrariness or the existence of some autonomous moral standard (such as platonic Forms) still apply. If the atheist claims that he is not being arbitrary, then why should the theist's viewpoint be considered any less arbitrary? The sword cuts both ways. It is more intelligence to place moral laws existence in a perfect moral being, then floating in impersonal irrational matter/Atoms independent of a mind.
Paul Copan concludes with,
“The theist has a plausible basis for this: human beings have value by virtue of their personhood, which is derived from the personhood of God? The ultimately valuable Being. Having been created in the image of God gives human beings their value. Their nature?with its moral, rational, and spiritual capacities? resemble God's. So to assume morality without God seems to miss the ontological implications of the question. That is, if there is no personal God to bestow personhood? And its attendant intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility, then we can't rightly say, "I can be a person with intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility even if God doesn't exist."
The Euthyphro argument should be dead now, but atheist keep using it over and over again.
John Frame says in his book “The Doctrine of God”
“So Plato, in Euthyphro, poses the question of whether piety is what the gods say it is, or whether the gods command piety because of its intrinsic nature, apart from their own wishes. In Plato’s mind, the former makes the nature of piety arbitrary, one that could change on the whim of a god. But the second alternative, which Plato certainly prefers, means that piety is independent of the will of the gods, something to which the gods opinions are subject.”
Atheists like this so called trap because to stop God having relative standards there must be an eternal abstract standard that judges God’s acts. They like it because even if there were no God, there would still be an objective standard by which atheists can establish objective morality.
The Atheist Philosopher Michael Martin says,
“For example, suppose God condemns rape because of his just and merciful character. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and action based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.”
So Martin wonders why the non-existence of God would adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice.
The problem with this argument is that ‘goodness” is not based on what ever God says. Goodness is the eternal nature of God and God is bound by his perfect nature to act “good”. God would not command people to rape or torture people because it is against his perfect nature. If God is the eternal uncaused cause of everything else that exist then he is the eternal source for moral goodness, which everything else takes its existence from.
Paul Copan makes a good point when he says,
“The "reasons" Martin offers for why rape is wrong already assume the dignity of human beings, the existence of universal human rights, an objective purpose/end for human existence, moral obligation, and moral responsibility. Thus Martin needs to offer a more robust explanation for these assumptions, but we have seen that the atheistic worldview lacks such resources while the theistic perspective anticipates a moral universe.”
In fact the very argument can be reversed back on to the atheist, for if objective moral properties just exist out in the universe independent of humans , then are they good because they are good or is there some independent standard of good to which they conform?" Thus the alleged dilemma Martin claims the theist faces is the very same one the atheist does. So there is no actual advantage for the atheist in presenting this challenge. The same potential charges of arbitrariness or the existence of some autonomous moral standard (such as platonic Forms) still apply. If the atheist claims that he is not being arbitrary, then why should the theist's viewpoint be considered any less arbitrary? The sword cuts both ways. It is more intelligence to place moral laws existence in a perfect moral being, then floating in impersonal irrational matter/Atoms independent of a mind.
Paul Copan concludes with,
“The theist has a plausible basis for this: human beings have value by virtue of their personhood, which is derived from the personhood of God? The ultimately valuable Being. Having been created in the image of God gives human beings their value. Their nature?with its moral, rational, and spiritual capacities? resemble God's. So to assume morality without God seems to miss the ontological implications of the question. That is, if there is no personal God to bestow personhood? And its attendant intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility, then we can't rightly say, "I can be a person with intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility even if God doesn't exist."
The Euthyphro argument should be dead now, but atheist keep using it over and over again.
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Paul Copan's Main Point's
I thought in this post I would draw out Paul Copan’s main points from his long essay. It is easy to get lost in a long essay. Copan is challenging Atheist Philosopher Michael Martin’s claim that we can have objective morality without God, a kind of moral realism.
Moral realism is the view that Moral values are some how objective properties of the universe independent of people views and opinions.
“Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective. Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.”
“Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear: God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did not exist].”
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide objective grounds for condemning rape? The same grounds used by God. Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist. The problem with Martins case is that he thinks that even if God did not exist rape would still be wrong because it victimizes the victim. In one sense this is true that victims would be abused, but this in itself does not establish an objective morality. Having knowledge of the “good”, does not give us a foundation for the existence of moral properties that exist independent of people in a godless universe. Also the idea of acts being wrong in a godless universe seems irrational as well, as nature just “is’.
“ Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim.”
Paul Copan is making the point that Michael Martin needs an ontological foundation for his claim for objective morality. The word “ontological” means what is it’s nature of being, what is the nature of this morality that exist independent of people. It is one thing to have a knowledge of a good moral subjective theory, but to state it is objective independent of people assumes that it exists somewhere out there and this is the question we need answered, “Where is this standard located”? If it is not part of objective reality then it is just an invention. Can Martin’s worldview gives us a foundation for these claims, I think not. Morality exists in moral beings, not impersonal parts of matter or atoms.
“So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of "justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see."
While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems, these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it is so, but the theist can give a rational reason for the foundation of objective morality independent of human beings and is not just an invention. If the truth was that there was no God then we should live that truth, that no opinion is better or worse than another, we only frustrate each others desires but none are wrong. But this is not the case,
“Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being, and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery, theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate personal Being.”
Moral realism is the view that Moral values are some how objective properties of the universe independent of people views and opinions.
“Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective. Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.”
“Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear: God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did not exist].”
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide objective grounds for condemning rape? The same grounds used by God. Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist. The problem with Martins case is that he thinks that even if God did not exist rape would still be wrong because it victimizes the victim. In one sense this is true that victims would be abused, but this in itself does not establish an objective morality. Having knowledge of the “good”, does not give us a foundation for the existence of moral properties that exist independent of people in a godless universe. Also the idea of acts being wrong in a godless universe seems irrational as well, as nature just “is’.
“ Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim.”
Paul Copan is making the point that Michael Martin needs an ontological foundation for his claim for objective morality. The word “ontological” means what is it’s nature of being, what is the nature of this morality that exist independent of people. It is one thing to have a knowledge of a good moral subjective theory, but to state it is objective independent of people assumes that it exists somewhere out there and this is the question we need answered, “Where is this standard located”? If it is not part of objective reality then it is just an invention. Can Martin’s worldview gives us a foundation for these claims, I think not. Morality exists in moral beings, not impersonal parts of matter or atoms.
“So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of "justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see."
While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems, these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it is so, but the theist can give a rational reason for the foundation of objective morality independent of human beings and is not just an invention. If the truth was that there was no God then we should live that truth, that no opinion is better or worse than another, we only frustrate each others desires but none are wrong. But this is not the case,
“Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being, and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery, theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate personal Being.”
Can Atheist Michael Martin be a Moral Realist?
This is a good article by Philosopher/Apologist Paul Copan,
At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling." He argues against the Mackian thesis that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective. Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma.
Is Atheistic Morality Necessarily Subjective?" A Question of Epistemology vs. Ontology
Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective. Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.
Martin rightly notes that not all theists share Swinburne's perspective. These theists, Martin adds, "maintain that atheistic morality must be subjective," and they usually assert this "without argument."
What is the position of these theists? In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Martin lays out their premises, which we'll call Theistic Argument A ( TA-A ):
If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists.
Morality is objective and absolute.
Therefore, God exists.
To make their case, Martin argues, theists must refute the following argument (Atheistic Argument A, or AA-A ) before their views on theistic morality can be taken seriously:
1. In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail.
2. But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail.
3. Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective.
One is led to believe that Martin will provide just such a basis, but, as we shall see below, his attempts to "ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis" do indeed fail. In addition, the challenge Martin offers can be taken up by theists, who can show that atheism lacks a sufficient basis for objective morality and, going further, show how theism furnishes precisely the necessary moral context. We shall proceed to take up this two-fold challenge.
To cite J. L. Mackie as the atheistic perspective on ethics, Martin claims, is unfair, as his is not the only one to consider. Mackie's views "certainly do not represent the views of all atheists." Nor do Mackie's arguments for a subjectivist ethic work, Martin holds. For instance, Mackie argues from disagreement (disagreement in ethical opinions supports ethical subjectivism) and from strangeness (moral properties are so strange that they would not fit into a naturalistic worldview). Martin disagrees with both of these arguments.
In response, Martin directly addresses the matter of disagreement, but his response to the strangeness argument is that, contra Mackie's internalist account, "moral realism is compatible with externalism." Martin does not give much of an argument for the latter except for a passing footnote
However, in the next section of his essay ("Is Theistic Morality Necessarily Objectivist?"), Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position. I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear: God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God. Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist. Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He merely addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping there. That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good is another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does not furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them.
Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim. But to affirm this is still not to offer the ontological basis for such affirmations. In his popular-level book The Big Domino in the Sky, Martin makes the same sorts of pronouncements, but again without ontological justification. For instance, he rightly declares that there have been "atheists of high moral character." Thus there is no reason to think that atheists are less moral than believers. Of course, Martin concedes, the question is not one about the moral character of atheists, but "whether they can justify their actions."
So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of "justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see. Moreover, Martin makes no effort. He merely claims that "ethical absolutism is compatible with atheism." Martin suggests, following Roderick Firth, an ideal observer view of ethics (in which a "good" is what "an ideal observer would approve under ideal condition") is an atheistic alternative. Another suggestion Martin makes is William Frankena's "sophisticated version of non-cognitivism." Even if such views could carry the day for the atheistic moral realist, the problem still remains?namely, accounting for the metaphysical or ontological status of personhood and its attendant intrinsic goodness still remains. While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems, these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it is so:
I see no reason to suppose that if the cultural and intellectual accomplishments of X are worthless, then X's life is worthless. A mother who has raised intelligent, healthy, morally upright children, a doctor whose life has been devoted to caring for the indigent, a teacher who has spent a lifetime teaching pupils to be just and compassionate?each may have accomplished little from a cultural or intellectual point of view, but each has led a worthwhile life nevertheless.
But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being, and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery, theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
Martin, who frequently cites David Brink as offering a model of moral realism without appealing to God, may likely argue: "But why can't moral properties be viewed as comparable to supervening mental properties? After all, many nontheistic contemporary philosophers of mind hold this view." Brink himself reasons: "Assuming materialism is true, mental states supervene on physical states, yet few think that mental states are metaphysically queer." However, such optimism is misguided, as it assumes a smooth transition from the nonmental to the mental (and the nonmoral to the moral). But to use mental supervenience as a plausible analogy for moral supervenience is astonishingly bold and, so far as contemporary philosophy of mind goes, unwarranted.
The same could be said for moral properties. Just as consciousness is easily accommodated within a theistic framework (in which a maximally-aware Creator creates conscious beings), so moral properties fit into a theistic scenario (in which a supremely-good/moral personal Being creates morally-constituted persons). Therefore affirming human dignity and universal human rights is not simply a brute fact. A theistic universe helps make far better sense of human dignity or human rights than a non-theistic, naturalistic universe. The Christian offers a superior contextual framework?a "richer metaphysical account as to why the cosmos is such that there are objective values."
Martin might reply: "You theists might claim that God is the sufficient reason for the existence of morality, but you are still just positing God in terms of a brute fact, some ultimate stopping point. So what prevents the atheist from claiming that objective morality and intrinsic human dignity simply exist as brute facts?" Up to a point, the atheist is correct: justification must end somewhere. But this does not mean that the theist and atheist are at an impasse.
Again, context is important. For instance, a hundred dollar bill has a greater value than a single dollar bill?even though they are the same size and contain (roughly) the same amounts of ink. It is the context (in this case, a conventional one) which enables us to ascribe varying values to these pieces of paper. What then is Martin's context for making sense of human worth? From his atheistic viewpoint, "There is no cosmic purpose if there is no God." We have before us the two relevant alternatives: (a) There is no cosmic purpose if there is no God and (b) There is a cosmic purpose if there is a God. At least prima facie, the existence of an objective human purpose is more obvious if God exists than if he does not.
Now Martin takes position that moral properties do exist independently of human beings:
Atheists not only can but have rejected this view [that human beings create values and do not discover them]. There is no reason why atheists cannot argue that values are discovered. For example, atheists such as Bertrand Russell in his early ethical writings argued that ?good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independent of our opinions just as much as round and square do.' Such qualities were discovered not created.
Now correlated to this affirmation is that somehow, intrinsic worth and a moral constitution supervene upon human beings through their having achieved a certain level of organismic complexity . According to David Brink, to whom Martin approvingly refers, this position is the most plausible position to take: "it is best for the [nontheistic] moral realist to claim that moral properties supervene upon physical properties."
So with this moral constitution, human beings have some inherent purpose, and therefore one ought to live one's life in a certain way (Says Martin: "Like Kant, I believe that one has a duty to fulfill one's talents.")
But if Martin's claim that there is "no cosmic purpose" is true, the relevant context for affirming a limited purpose is far from obvious. Martin moves from purposeless, impersonal, amoral, materialistic or naturalistic processes to? viol? !?the emergence of intrinsically-valuable, personal, moral beings. Again, I simply do not see that his worldview has the ontological resources to bring about this remarkable transformation. Within theism, on the other hand, there exists a continuity, a smooth transition of intrinsic dignity?from a maximally-great personal Being to valuable created persons?as opposed to the naturalistic shift from the nonmoral to the moral. This moral continuity ?the transference of moral properties from one moral Being to beings made in his image?has greater explanatory power than the disjunction between them on the naturalistic view. In the theistic view, moral properties have an ontological simplicity?as opposed to the naturalistic construal, in which moral properties are not ontologically simple.
Thus theists can take up Martin's challenge and offer a far more plausible basis for objective morality than the atheist can. We noted earlier Martin's argument ( AA-A ) against the theist who claims to have an objectivist ethic that the atheist does not have: In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail. But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail. Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective.
On the epistemological level, Martin is rightly shocked by "Christian apologists"?whoever they may be?who claim that "atheists can provide no objective reason for not raping people." Theists and atheists alike can affirm the same moral principles as objectively true. But at the ontological level, it is the theistic apologist who is rightly shocked at Martin's claim. For Martin's worldview offers no obvious resources to affirm the uniqueness and dignity of the human being, individual human rights, personal responsibility, moral obligation, and the moral value of a cohesive social fabric. Thus, we can reply to Martin with the following syllogism (Theistic Argument B, or TA-B ): To ground an objective moral order, the atheist must show how naturalism furnishes an ontological framework for the intrinsic dignity of human beings, universal human rights, and moral responsibility. The atheist has shown no such ontological foundation (based on naturalism) to account for intrinsic human dignity, human rights, etc. Therefore, the atheist's attempt to ground an objective morality fails.
On the other hand, the theist (as we saw above) can make a plausible moral connection between God and human beings. It is this personal and moral connection which grounds the dignity/value, rights, purpose, and responsibility of human beings. It is only on this assumption ?at the ontological level?of humans' being intrinsically valuable that we can rise to the next level?the epistemological ?to know that rape, for instance, "violates the victim's rights . . . traumatizes the victim . . . undermines the fabric of society, and so on."
What we have before us is then is a matter of theism's greater contextual probability. Furthermore, there are certain additional facts about the world which are much more probable or make much more sense if God exists than if he does not: exist at all). "
Moreover, the theistic foundation for morality has the virtue of greater simplicity on its side in that it offers a plausible linking of two distinct entities that, in an atheistic world, must be joined in some ad hoc fashion. These two entities are objective moral values and human persons.
On the one hand, a metaphysical naturalist like Martin apparently presupposes that moral properties supervene on "correctly-related" or "complexly-conjoined" non-moral ones. Then somehow two apparently unconnected components within the universe?namely, (a) these emergent moral properties and (b) the moral principles of justice, mercy, and kindness, which are analytically-true brute givens whether or not any human beings exist?happen to be, by fantastic coincidence, intimately related. Now Martin holds that moral truths exist as part of the cosmic furniture, and he also maintains that humans (independent of these standards) evolved naturalistically to such a point at which they became moral beings.
But why think that these moral principles which exist even apply to us or morally obligate us? To say that moral values are "just there" seems insufficient. Isn't it an extraordinary coincidence that out of all possible creatures that have evolved, human beings should just happen to have obligations to these pre-existing, analytically-true objective moral values? It seems that the evolutionary process somehow anticipated the arrival of human beings on the scene. But a less ad hoc candidate is the theistic alternative. (And, we could add, even if moral properties did exist on a naturalistic scheme of things, why think that moral obligation exists?particularly when such a duty conflicts with my self-interest?)
Whereas these are two unconnected entities appear to pose a problem for the metaphysical naturalist, theism brings them together in a much more concise way: A personal God, who is the source of moral values, makes human persons in his image, and thus they share important moral and spiritual characteristics with God. Theism provides a match between our moral make-up and the structure of ultimate reality.
Thus objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe (despite Martin's claims to the contrary), objective morality?along with its assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral responsibility?is unnatural and surprising and "queer."
At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling." He argues against the Mackian thesis that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective. Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma.
Is Atheistic Morality Necessarily Subjective?" A Question of Epistemology vs. Ontology
Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective. Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.
Martin rightly notes that not all theists share Swinburne's perspective. These theists, Martin adds, "maintain that atheistic morality must be subjective," and they usually assert this "without argument."
What is the position of these theists? In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Martin lays out their premises, which we'll call Theistic Argument A ( TA-A ):
If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists.
Morality is objective and absolute.
Therefore, God exists.
To make their case, Martin argues, theists must refute the following argument (Atheistic Argument A, or AA-A ) before their views on theistic morality can be taken seriously:
1. In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail.
2. But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail.
3. Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective.
One is led to believe that Martin will provide just such a basis, but, as we shall see below, his attempts to "ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis" do indeed fail. In addition, the challenge Martin offers can be taken up by theists, who can show that atheism lacks a sufficient basis for objective morality and, going further, show how theism furnishes precisely the necessary moral context. We shall proceed to take up this two-fold challenge.
To cite J. L. Mackie as the atheistic perspective on ethics, Martin claims, is unfair, as his is not the only one to consider. Mackie's views "certainly do not represent the views of all atheists." Nor do Mackie's arguments for a subjectivist ethic work, Martin holds. For instance, Mackie argues from disagreement (disagreement in ethical opinions supports ethical subjectivism) and from strangeness (moral properties are so strange that they would not fit into a naturalistic worldview). Martin disagrees with both of these arguments.
In response, Martin directly addresses the matter of disagreement, but his response to the strangeness argument is that, contra Mackie's internalist account, "moral realism is compatible with externalism." Martin does not give much of an argument for the latter except for a passing footnote
However, in the next section of his essay ("Is Theistic Morality Necessarily Objectivist?"), Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position. I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear: God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God. Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist. Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He merely addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping there. That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good is another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does not furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them.
Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim. But to affirm this is still not to offer the ontological basis for such affirmations. In his popular-level book The Big Domino in the Sky, Martin makes the same sorts of pronouncements, but again without ontological justification. For instance, he rightly declares that there have been "atheists of high moral character." Thus there is no reason to think that atheists are less moral than believers. Of course, Martin concedes, the question is not one about the moral character of atheists, but "whether they can justify their actions."
So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of "justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see. Moreover, Martin makes no effort. He merely claims that "ethical absolutism is compatible with atheism." Martin suggests, following Roderick Firth, an ideal observer view of ethics (in which a "good" is what "an ideal observer would approve under ideal condition") is an atheistic alternative. Another suggestion Martin makes is William Frankena's "sophisticated version of non-cognitivism." Even if such views could carry the day for the atheistic moral realist, the problem still remains?namely, accounting for the metaphysical or ontological status of personhood and its attendant intrinsic goodness still remains. While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems, these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it is so:
I see no reason to suppose that if the cultural and intellectual accomplishments of X are worthless, then X's life is worthless. A mother who has raised intelligent, healthy, morally upright children, a doctor whose life has been devoted to caring for the indigent, a teacher who has spent a lifetime teaching pupils to be just and compassionate?each may have accomplished little from a cultural or intellectual point of view, but each has led a worthwhile life nevertheless.
But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being, and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery, theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
Martin, who frequently cites David Brink as offering a model of moral realism without appealing to God, may likely argue: "But why can't moral properties be viewed as comparable to supervening mental properties? After all, many nontheistic contemporary philosophers of mind hold this view." Brink himself reasons: "Assuming materialism is true, mental states supervene on physical states, yet few think that mental states are metaphysically queer." However, such optimism is misguided, as it assumes a smooth transition from the nonmental to the mental (and the nonmoral to the moral). But to use mental supervenience as a plausible analogy for moral supervenience is astonishingly bold and, so far as contemporary philosophy of mind goes, unwarranted.
The same could be said for moral properties. Just as consciousness is easily accommodated within a theistic framework (in which a maximally-aware Creator creates conscious beings), so moral properties fit into a theistic scenario (in which a supremely-good/moral personal Being creates morally-constituted persons). Therefore affirming human dignity and universal human rights is not simply a brute fact. A theistic universe helps make far better sense of human dignity or human rights than a non-theistic, naturalistic universe. The Christian offers a superior contextual framework?a "richer metaphysical account as to why the cosmos is such that there are objective values."
Martin might reply: "You theists might claim that God is the sufficient reason for the existence of morality, but you are still just positing God in terms of a brute fact, some ultimate stopping point. So what prevents the atheist from claiming that objective morality and intrinsic human dignity simply exist as brute facts?" Up to a point, the atheist is correct: justification must end somewhere. But this does not mean that the theist and atheist are at an impasse.
Again, context is important. For instance, a hundred dollar bill has a greater value than a single dollar bill?even though they are the same size and contain (roughly) the same amounts of ink. It is the context (in this case, a conventional one) which enables us to ascribe varying values to these pieces of paper. What then is Martin's context for making sense of human worth? From his atheistic viewpoint, "There is no cosmic purpose if there is no God." We have before us the two relevant alternatives: (a) There is no cosmic purpose if there is no God and (b) There is a cosmic purpose if there is a God. At least prima facie, the existence of an objective human purpose is more obvious if God exists than if he does not.
Now Martin takes position that moral properties do exist independently of human beings:
Atheists not only can but have rejected this view [that human beings create values and do not discover them]. There is no reason why atheists cannot argue that values are discovered. For example, atheists such as Bertrand Russell in his early ethical writings argued that ?good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independent of our opinions just as much as round and square do.' Such qualities were discovered not created.
Now correlated to this affirmation is that somehow, intrinsic worth and a moral constitution supervene upon human beings through their having achieved a certain level of organismic complexity . According to David Brink, to whom Martin approvingly refers, this position is the most plausible position to take: "it is best for the [nontheistic] moral realist to claim that moral properties supervene upon physical properties."
So with this moral constitution, human beings have some inherent purpose, and therefore one ought to live one's life in a certain way (Says Martin: "Like Kant, I believe that one has a duty to fulfill one's talents.")
But if Martin's claim that there is "no cosmic purpose" is true, the relevant context for affirming a limited purpose is far from obvious. Martin moves from purposeless, impersonal, amoral, materialistic or naturalistic processes to? viol? !?the emergence of intrinsically-valuable, personal, moral beings. Again, I simply do not see that his worldview has the ontological resources to bring about this remarkable transformation. Within theism, on the other hand, there exists a continuity, a smooth transition of intrinsic dignity?from a maximally-great personal Being to valuable created persons?as opposed to the naturalistic shift from the nonmoral to the moral. This moral continuity ?the transference of moral properties from one moral Being to beings made in his image?has greater explanatory power than the disjunction between them on the naturalistic view. In the theistic view, moral properties have an ontological simplicity?as opposed to the naturalistic construal, in which moral properties are not ontologically simple.
Thus theists can take up Martin's challenge and offer a far more plausible basis for objective morality than the atheist can. We noted earlier Martin's argument ( AA-A ) against the theist who claims to have an objectivist ethic that the atheist does not have: In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail. But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail. Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective.
On the epistemological level, Martin is rightly shocked by "Christian apologists"?whoever they may be?who claim that "atheists can provide no objective reason for not raping people." Theists and atheists alike can affirm the same moral principles as objectively true. But at the ontological level, it is the theistic apologist who is rightly shocked at Martin's claim. For Martin's worldview offers no obvious resources to affirm the uniqueness and dignity of the human being, individual human rights, personal responsibility, moral obligation, and the moral value of a cohesive social fabric. Thus, we can reply to Martin with the following syllogism (Theistic Argument B, or TA-B ): To ground an objective moral order, the atheist must show how naturalism furnishes an ontological framework for the intrinsic dignity of human beings, universal human rights, and moral responsibility. The atheist has shown no such ontological foundation (based on naturalism) to account for intrinsic human dignity, human rights, etc. Therefore, the atheist's attempt to ground an objective morality fails.
On the other hand, the theist (as we saw above) can make a plausible moral connection between God and human beings. It is this personal and moral connection which grounds the dignity/value, rights, purpose, and responsibility of human beings. It is only on this assumption ?at the ontological level?of humans' being intrinsically valuable that we can rise to the next level?the epistemological ?to know that rape, for instance, "violates the victim's rights . . . traumatizes the victim . . . undermines the fabric of society, and so on."
What we have before us is then is a matter of theism's greater contextual probability. Furthermore, there are certain additional facts about the world which are much more probable or make much more sense if God exists than if he does not: exist at all). "
Moreover, the theistic foundation for morality has the virtue of greater simplicity on its side in that it offers a plausible linking of two distinct entities that, in an atheistic world, must be joined in some ad hoc fashion. These two entities are objective moral values and human persons.
On the one hand, a metaphysical naturalist like Martin apparently presupposes that moral properties supervene on "correctly-related" or "complexly-conjoined" non-moral ones. Then somehow two apparently unconnected components within the universe?namely, (a) these emergent moral properties and (b) the moral principles of justice, mercy, and kindness, which are analytically-true brute givens whether or not any human beings exist?happen to be, by fantastic coincidence, intimately related. Now Martin holds that moral truths exist as part of the cosmic furniture, and he also maintains that humans (independent of these standards) evolved naturalistically to such a point at which they became moral beings.
But why think that these moral principles which exist even apply to us or morally obligate us? To say that moral values are "just there" seems insufficient. Isn't it an extraordinary coincidence that out of all possible creatures that have evolved, human beings should just happen to have obligations to these pre-existing, analytically-true objective moral values? It seems that the evolutionary process somehow anticipated the arrival of human beings on the scene. But a less ad hoc candidate is the theistic alternative. (And, we could add, even if moral properties did exist on a naturalistic scheme of things, why think that moral obligation exists?particularly when such a duty conflicts with my self-interest?)
Whereas these are two unconnected entities appear to pose a problem for the metaphysical naturalist, theism brings them together in a much more concise way: A personal God, who is the source of moral values, makes human persons in his image, and thus they share important moral and spiritual characteristics with God. Theism provides a match between our moral make-up and the structure of ultimate reality.
Thus objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe (despite Martin's claims to the contrary), objective morality?along with its assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral responsibility?is unnatural and surprising and "queer."
Saturday, March 15, 2008
Nature and Convention, What's the Difference!
When it comes to morality the question that is usual asked is “what is true morality”? What is true goodness, true justice and who defines it or how do we even discover it are the questions that must be answered. For atheist’s who believe in a godless universe the concepts of absolute good and evil, right wrong become very hard to define. If one is seeking to find “what is’ and not what some one thinks “ought to be the case” one must study nature. For nature is “what is” it can not be any other way. For the atheist humans have a nature, that is not corrupted or immoral. It acts according to its nature. Our nature has desires and we act on them. Good and Evil are not exactly the products of the will, but they are the reflection of it. The will is blind and can not give us a rational justification for the ultimate ends that we pursue. If one wants to be a true atheist and live according to true morality, then he must live according to nature, which is what “is”. All actions are right as they reflect our nature to desire. If we want an objective standard that reflects a godless universe that has nothing to do with human edict, customs and rules, that is in no sense fabricated or dependent on what anyone says or does. Then we must seek “nature”. The laws of nature are not things that are so because someone has decreed that they should be so, or because people have become accustomed to so regarding them. They are so everywhere, no matter what anyone might think or do. They are not relative, then, to customs, laws, opinions, or conventions. For they are true by nature.
Do atheists want to live according to their “true” morality, that being “anything goes”. The law of nature is basically the law of anarchy. Rape, murder, lust, greed is all part of our nature. This is what our nature desires. Nature also does not show us that all humans are created equal. If one wants to keep to “true’ morality then the idea of human rights becomes an illusion. We are in fact suppressing individual rights to do what they want.
If atheist can’t accept this view of morality then the other option is convention morality. This view enters the realm of relative opinion, no view is better or worse than another just different, and any of them could change over time. In this view morality of what is good is just an invention of people desires. They are clearly man made and could have been other wise. The question must still be asked about conventions, do they correspond with what is right? In the end the idea of goodness becomes an empty concept corresponding to nothing absolute. So how is an atheist to talk about true morality? When both nature and convention can justify any act. What is the definition of an immoral behavior? Are there no actions that we consider absolutely wrong apart from opinions, which destroys the power of the obligation to summit to any rule. The problem with the atheist is that a godless universe is goodness free and evil free world. Humans are not created inherently good nor are they struggling with a sinful nature that is acting against the way it should act. It just seems that atheist cant get away from a moral universe. Our minds just know deep down that something’s are wrong no matter what people views are on it. That some of our actions are wrong, but this implies that we have a corrupt nature fallen from some absolute objective standard of goodness.
Do atheists want to live according to their “true” morality, that being “anything goes”. The law of nature is basically the law of anarchy. Rape, murder, lust, greed is all part of our nature. This is what our nature desires. Nature also does not show us that all humans are created equal. If one wants to keep to “true’ morality then the idea of human rights becomes an illusion. We are in fact suppressing individual rights to do what they want.
If atheist can’t accept this view of morality then the other option is convention morality. This view enters the realm of relative opinion, no view is better or worse than another just different, and any of them could change over time. In this view morality of what is good is just an invention of people desires. They are clearly man made and could have been other wise. The question must still be asked about conventions, do they correspond with what is right? In the end the idea of goodness becomes an empty concept corresponding to nothing absolute. So how is an atheist to talk about true morality? When both nature and convention can justify any act. What is the definition of an immoral behavior? Are there no actions that we consider absolutely wrong apart from opinions, which destroys the power of the obligation to summit to any rule. The problem with the atheist is that a godless universe is goodness free and evil free world. Humans are not created inherently good nor are they struggling with a sinful nature that is acting against the way it should act. It just seems that atheist cant get away from a moral universe. Our minds just know deep down that something’s are wrong no matter what people views are on it. That some of our actions are wrong, but this implies that we have a corrupt nature fallen from some absolute objective standard of goodness.
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