Just for the Record

John Morales has made the comment that Christianity has a record for committing mass killings and genocide’s. This is one of the Atheists favorite arguments against Religion, assuming that Religion is the cause of most wars. It is true that both sides have committed acts that are clearly wrong, but the record is held by Atheists.

You may want to look at Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod in their massive 1502 page 3-volume encyclopedia of war. It is compiled by nine reputable professors of history, including the director of the centre of military history and the former head of the centre for defence studies. They conclude that from what we know from history there have been about 1763 wars and only 123 have been over religion. This makes religion 6.98 percent accountable. If you take away the wars from Mulisms it drops down to 3.23 percent.

I dont think the evidence proves that religion is the cause of war or mass murdering.

Here is another source from “Stand to Reason”

A blight on Christianity? Certainty. Something wrong? Dismally wrong. A tragedy? Of course. Millions and millions of people killed? No. The numbers are tragic, but pale in comparison to the statistics of what non-religion criminals have committed.
My point is not that Christians or religious people aren’t vulnerable to committing terrible crimes. Certainly they are. But it is not religion that produces these things; it is the denial of Biblical religion that generally leads to these kinds of things. The statistics that are the result of irreligious genocide stagger the imagination.

My source is The Guinness Book of World Records . Look up the category “Judicial” and under the subject of “Crimes: Mass Killings,” the greatest massacre ever imputed by the government of one sovereign against the government of another is 26.3 million Chinese during the regime of Mao Tse Tung between the years of 1949 and May 1965. The Walker Report published by the U.S. Senate Committee of the Judiciary in July 1971 placed the parameters of the total death toll in China since 1949 between 32 and 61.7 million people. An estimate of 63.7 million was published by Figaro magazine on November 5, 1978.

In the U.S.S.R. the Nobel Prize winner, Alexander Solzhenitsyn estimates the loss of life from state repression and terrorism from October 1917 to December 1959 under Lenin and Stalin and Khrushchev at 66.7 million.
Finally, in Cambodia (and this was close to me because I lived in Thailand in 1982 working with the broken pieces of the Cambodian holocaust from 1975 to 1979) “as a percentage of a nation’s total population, the worst genocide appears to be that in Cambodia, formerly Kampuchea. According to the Khmer Rouge foreign minister, more than one third of the eight million Khmer were killed between April 17, 1975 and January 1979. One third of the entire country was put to death under the rule of Pol Pot, the founder of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. During that time towns, money and property were abolished. Economic execution by bayonet and club was introduced for such offenses as falling asleep during the day, asking too many questions, playing non-communist music, being old and feeble, being the offspring of an undesirable, or being too well educated. In fact, deaths in the Tuol Sleng interrogation center in Phnom Penh, which is the capitol of Kampuchea, reached 582 in a day.”

Then in Chinese history of the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries there were three periods of wholesale massacre. The numbers of victims attributed to these events are assertions rather than reliable estimates. The figures put on the Mongolian invasion of northern China form 1210 to 1219 and from 1311 to 1340 are both on the order of 35 million people. While the number of victims of bandit leader Chang Hsien-Chung, known as the Yellow Tiger, from 1643 to 1647 in the Szechwan province has been put at 40 million people.

China under Mao Tse Tung, 26.3 million Chinese. According the Walker Report, 63.7 million over the whole period of time of the Communist revolution in China. Solzhenitsyn says the Soviet Union put to death 66.7 million people. Kampuchea destroyed one third of their entire population of eight million Cambodians. The Chinese at two different times in medieval history, somewhere in the vicinity of 35 million and 40 million people. Ladies and gentlemen, make note that these deaths were the result of organizations or points of view or ideologies that had left God out of the equation. None of these involve religion. And all but the very last actually assert atheism.

I think I could even find more…

Atheist's and the Golden Rule!

Atheists assume that it is easy to see what ‘goodness’ is and so they think there is no reasons on earth why we need God to know it. For them goodness is based on the Golden rule “Do on to others what you would like done to your self’. It may be one thing to say it’s easy to see the statement is true, but it is another to state that our actions are in fact good. The History of Atheism shows that they have struggled to see what Goodness is as they are accountable for most of the mass killings and genocide’s in the world. Atheism has killed more people than Religion. Also if it is so easy to see what is the good, why is it taking so long for the human race to live it out. It seems strange that Jesus didn’t spend years debating with the philosophers of his age what was good and useful for mankind. No he just spoke the perfect ethics into being from the Fathers heart and Character.

I’m afraid Atheists that it is not that easy to just try and pinch Christianity's objective perfect morality and throw away God.

Vox Day makes a good point in his book “The Irrational Atheist”

“It is often asserted that Christian morality is no different than other ethical systems that are based on the Golden rule. And it is true that one can find pre-Christian examples of the same concepts in the Analects of Confucius, in the Mahabharata, the Dhammapada, the Udanavarga, and even in the histories of Herodotus.”

But the problem with this attack, that all people can see what the good is , and that it is not based on Christian morality is that Christianity’s morality is not just based on the Golden rule, which states that man should not do to others what he would not have them do to him. It is based on doing the Fathers perfect (God’s) will. But just stating the above cannot provide us with a functional moral system.
Obviously a moral system based on loving the Lord your God and obediently submitting your will to his is a very different moral system and far more objective one than the Golden rule, which is not only entirely subjective, but incapable of accounting for either rational calculation or human psychopathy. It provides no moral basis to criticize a man for crawling into Adriana’s bed unannounced so long as he harbors no desire to bar her from doing the same to him, and sanctions a thief to steal on the grounds of a belief that he wouldn’t miss that which was stolen were the thief himself the prospective victim. The Golden rule is also to easily transformed into the idea of doing unto others as you believe they wish to do unto you.

The problem still is, What is “Right”? what is “Good”. As Cleeray says, there is no ontological nature of goodness, it just is what we think other people wouldn’t mind. It just seems strange that Jesus’ ethics do not injure any one but promotes complete peace and atheist's are still trying to iron out the few mistakes in there concepts so that we can all get along. It just seems that millions have to be murdered first to get the system working.

Responding to John Morales

I deciding to post my recent posting, titled “Nature and Convention” on an Atheist Web site called www.mycaseagainstgod.blogspot.com. I thought I would do this to see what response I would get to my argument. One thinker by the name of “John Morales” responded and I’m not sure by his words if he thinks my post is good or if he is taking the Mickey of me. But for one thing he thinks that I am close to making a contradiction in my thinking. So it is this claim that I will be responding to. For some it might be wise to re-read my post…

John Morales wrote,

Interesting rant, Richard.
How's it go?
"If one wants to be a true atheist and live according to true morality, then he must live according to nature"..."The law of nature is basically the law of anarchy. Rape, murder, lust, greed is all part of our nature. This is what our nature desires"..."The problem with the atheist is that a godless universe is a goodness free and evil free world"..."Our minds just know deep down that something’s are wrong no matter what people views are on it".
Wow. You may be undermining your strawman with a contradiction, but you sure know how to project.

I think John is hinting that if I am making the case “that all our desires are part of nature” then aren’t the desires that feel that some things are just right and wrong independent of peoples opinions just desires from our nature. So what is my point, aren’t I just saying that objective morality is part of nature as well. So in fact my strawman to refute the atheists foundation for morality is basically refuting my own evidence. But I don’t think this is the case and I don’t think my argument is a contradiction. John is right, it would be a contradiction “if” I assumed the atheist’s worldview, but I don’t. There is a great difference between the two worldviews. Atheism’s “true” morality is basically just what “is” and my Christian foundation is that morality is not what “is” but what we “ought” to do and our human nature is inherently good but fallen, which is very different form the worldview of atheism that says our nature just “is”. It hasn’t been made or created to act good, but just according to what it does and feels.

I also think the atheist’s argument fails for a number of reasons,

1.If objective morality theories were just part of our nature, then it would be just another desire among millions of subjective choices one can choose. If this is the case then its claims have no more power or worth greater than any other.

2. From an atheist worldview there is no moral law written on our hearts, our inner being dose not have knowledge of goodness according to our inherent ontological good nature. So is left with intuition reasoning upon random blind choices.

3. Atheist also can’t defend Objective morality independent of human beings, which Michael Martin tries to do. It is one thing to have a knowledge of a good moral subjective theory, but to state it is objective independent of people assumes that it exists somewhere out there and this is the question we need answered, “Where is this standard located”? If it is not part of objective reality then it is just an invention. Can Martin’s or the atheist give us a foundation for these claims, I think not. Morality exists in moral beings, not impersonal parts of matter or atoms floating around in space.

4. Living for the good is also meaningless if there is no such thing as an ontological foundation for human dignity and worth. Responsibility is meaningless without a good nature that seeks an absolute standard of goodness.

5. Also in an atheist worldview, is the ‘good’ good because one says its good or is the act good because it corresponds to what is ontologically good?

The reason why the atheist knows right from wrong, is because he is made in the image of God with his laws written on their hearts.

The Euthyphro Argument fails!

When it comes to establishing absolute moral standards in God, atheist continue to use the Euthuphro argument to try and trap God and discredit his standard for goodness. The Euthyphro dilemma raised by Socrates was: "Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" Atheist are quick to see that if what is good is based on what God commands then anything that God commands even if it was rape would by logic be good. So atheist imply that for god to be good there must be an independent moral standard of “Goodness” that judges God actions.

John Frame says in his book “The Doctrine of God”

“So Plato, in Euthyphro, poses the question of whether piety is what the gods say it is, or whether the gods command piety because of its intrinsic nature, apart from their own wishes. In Plato’s mind, the former makes the nature of piety arbitrary, one that could change on the whim of a god. But the second alternative, which Plato certainly prefers, means that piety is independent of the will of the gods, something to which the gods opinions are subject.”

Atheists like this so called trap because to stop God having relative standards there must be an eternal abstract standard that judges God’s acts. They like it because even if there were no God, there would still be an objective standard by which atheists can establish objective morality.

The Atheist Philosopher Michael Martin says,

“For example, suppose God condemns rape because of his just and merciful character. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and action based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.”

So Martin wonders why the non-existence of God would adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice.
The problem with this argument is that ‘goodness” is not based on what ever God says. Goodness is the eternal nature of God and God is bound by his perfect nature to act “good”. God would not command people to rape or torture people because it is against his perfect nature. If God is the eternal uncaused cause of everything else that exist then he is the eternal source for moral goodness, which everything else takes its existence from.

Paul Copan makes a good point when he says,

“The "reasons" Martin offers for why rape is wrong already assume the dignity of human beings, the existence of universal human rights, an objective purpose/end for human existence, moral obligation, and moral responsibility. Thus Martin needs to offer a more robust explanation for these assumptions, but we have seen that the atheistic worldview lacks such resources while the theistic perspective anticipates a moral universe.”

In fact the very argument can be reversed back on to the atheist, for if objective moral properties just exist out in the universe independent of humans , then are they good because they are good or is there some independent standard of good to which they conform?" Thus the alleged dilemma Martin claims the theist faces is the very same one the atheist does. So there is no actual advantage for the atheist in presenting this challenge. The same potential charges of arbitrariness or the existence of some autonomous moral standard (such as platonic Forms) still apply. If the atheist claims that he is not being arbitrary, then why should the theist's viewpoint be considered any less arbitrary? The sword cuts both ways. It is more intelligence to place moral laws existence in a perfect moral being, then floating in impersonal irrational matter/Atoms independent of a mind.

Paul Copan concludes with,

“The theist has a plausible basis for this: human beings have value by virtue of their personhood, which is derived from the personhood of God? The ultimately valuable Being. Having been created in the image of God gives human beings their value. Their nature?with its moral, rational, and spiritual capacities? resemble God's. So to assume morality without God seems to miss the ontological implications of the question. That is, if there is no personal God to bestow personhood? And its attendant intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility, then we can't rightly say, "I can be a person with intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility even if God doesn't exist."

The Euthyphro argument should be dead now, but atheist keep using it over and over again.

Paul Copan's Main Point's

I thought in this post I would draw out Paul Copan’s main points from his long essay. It is easy to get lost in a long essay. Copan is challenging Atheist Philosopher Michael Martin’s claim that we can have objective morality without God, a kind of moral realism.
Moral realism is the view that Moral values are some how objective properties of the universe independent of people views and opinions.

“Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective. Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.”

“Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear: God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did not exist].”

Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide objective grounds for condemning rape? The same grounds used by God. Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist. The problem with Martins case is that he thinks that even if God did not exist rape would still be wrong because it victimizes the victim. In one sense this is true that victims would be abused, but this in itself does not establish an objective morality. Having knowledge of the “good”, does not give us a foundation for the existence of moral properties that exist independent of people in a godless universe. Also the idea of acts being wrong in a godless universe seems irrational as well, as nature just “is’.

“ Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim.”

Paul Copan is making the point that Michael Martin needs an ontological foundation for his claim for objective morality. The word “ontological” means what is it’s nature of being, what is the nature of this morality that exist independent of people. It is one thing to have a knowledge of a good moral subjective theory, but to state it is objective independent of people assumes that it exists somewhere out there and this is the question we need answered, “Where is this standard located”? If it is not part of objective reality then it is just an invention. Can Martin’s worldview gives us a foundation for these claims, I think not. Morality exists in moral beings, not impersonal parts of matter or atoms.

“So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of "justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see."

While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems, these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it is so, but the theist can give a rational reason for the foundation of objective morality independent of human beings and is not just an invention. If the truth was that there was no God then we should live that truth, that no opinion is better or worse than another, we only frustrate each others desires but none are wrong. But this is not the case,

“Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being, and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery, theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate personal Being.”

Can Atheist Michael Martin be a Moral Realist?

This is a good article by Philosopher/Apologist Paul Copan,

At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling." He argues against the Mackian thesis that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective. Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma.

Is Atheistic Morality Necessarily Subjective?" A Question of Epistemology vs. Ontology

Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective. Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.
Martin rightly notes that not all theists share Swinburne's perspective. These theists, Martin adds, "maintain that atheistic morality must be subjective," and they usually assert this "without argument."
What is the position of these theists? In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Martin lays out their premises, which we'll call Theistic Argument A ( TA-A ):
If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists.
Morality is objective and absolute.
Therefore, God exists.
To make their case, Martin argues, theists must refute the following argument (Atheistic Argument A, or AA-A ) before their views on theistic morality can be taken seriously:
1. In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail.
2. But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail.
3. Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective.

One is led to believe that Martin will provide just such a basis, but, as we shall see below, his attempts to "ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis" do indeed fail. In addition, the challenge Martin offers can be taken up by theists, who can show that atheism lacks a sufficient basis for objective morality and, going further, show how theism furnishes precisely the necessary moral context. We shall proceed to take up this two-fold challenge.
To cite J. L. Mackie as the atheistic perspective on ethics, Martin claims, is unfair, as his is not the only one to consider. Mackie's views "certainly do not represent the views of all atheists." Nor do Mackie's arguments for a subjectivist ethic work, Martin holds. For instance, Mackie argues from disagreement (disagreement in ethical opinions supports ethical subjectivism) and from strangeness (moral properties are so strange that they would not fit into a naturalistic worldview). Martin disagrees with both of these arguments.
In response, Martin directly addresses the matter of disagreement, but his response to the strangeness argument is that, contra Mackie's internalist account, "moral realism is compatible with externalism." Martin does not give much of an argument for the latter except for a passing footnote
However, in the next section of his essay ("Is Theistic Morality Necessarily Objectivist?"), Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position. I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear: God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God. Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist. Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He merely addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping there. That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good is another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does not furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them.
Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim. But to affirm this is still not to offer the ontological basis for such affirmations. In his popular-level book The Big Domino in the Sky, Martin makes the same sorts of pronouncements, but again without ontological justification. For instance, he rightly declares that there have been "atheists of high moral character." Thus there is no reason to think that atheists are less moral than believers. Of course, Martin concedes, the question is not one about the moral character of atheists, but "whether they can justify their actions."
So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of "justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see. Moreover, Martin makes no effort. He merely claims that "ethical absolutism is compatible with atheism." Martin suggests, following Roderick Firth, an ideal observer view of ethics (in which a "good" is what "an ideal observer would approve under ideal condition") is an atheistic alternative. Another suggestion Martin makes is William Frankena's "sophisticated version of non-cognitivism." Even if such views could carry the day for the atheistic moral realist, the problem still remains?namely, accounting for the metaphysical or ontological status of personhood and its attendant intrinsic goodness still remains. While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems, these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it is so:
I see no reason to suppose that if the cultural and intellectual accomplishments of X are worthless, then X's life is worthless. A mother who has raised intelligent, healthy, morally upright children, a doctor whose life has been devoted to caring for the indigent, a teacher who has spent a lifetime teaching pupils to be just and compassionate?each may have accomplished little from a cultural or intellectual point of view, but each has led a worthwhile life nevertheless.
But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being, and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery, theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
Martin, who frequently cites David Brink as offering a model of moral realism without appealing to God, may likely argue: "But why can't moral properties be viewed as comparable to supervening mental properties? After all, many nontheistic contemporary philosophers of mind hold this view." Brink himself reasons: "Assuming materialism is true, mental states supervene on physical states, yet few think that mental states are metaphysically queer." However, such optimism is misguided, as it assumes a smooth transition from the nonmental to the mental (and the nonmoral to the moral). But to use mental supervenience as a plausible analogy for moral supervenience is astonishingly bold and, so far as contemporary philosophy of mind goes, unwarranted.
The same could be said for moral properties. Just as consciousness is easily accommodated within a theistic framework (in which a maximally-aware Creator creates conscious beings), so moral properties fit into a theistic scenario (in which a supremely-good/moral personal Being creates morally-constituted persons). Therefore affirming human dignity and universal human rights is not simply a brute fact. A theistic universe helps make far better sense of human dignity or human rights than a non-theistic, naturalistic universe. The Christian offers a superior contextual framework?a "richer metaphysical account as to why the cosmos is such that there are objective values."
Martin might reply: "You theists might claim that God is the sufficient reason for the existence of morality, but you are still just positing God in terms of a brute fact, some ultimate stopping point. So what prevents the atheist from claiming that objective morality and intrinsic human dignity simply exist as brute facts?" Up to a point, the atheist is correct: justification must end somewhere. But this does not mean that the theist and atheist are at an impasse.
Again, context is important. For instance, a hundred dollar bill has a greater value than a single dollar bill?even though they are the same size and contain (roughly) the same amounts of ink. It is the context (in this case, a conventional one) which enables us to ascribe varying values to these pieces of paper. What then is Martin's context for making sense of human worth? From his atheistic viewpoint, "There is no cosmic purpose if there is no God." We have before us the two relevant alternatives: (a) There is no cosmic purpose if there is no God and (b) There is a cosmic purpose if there is a God. At least prima facie, the existence of an objective human purpose is more obvious if God exists than if he does not.
Now Martin takes position that moral properties do exist independently of human beings:
Atheists not only can but have rejected this view [that human beings create values and do not discover them]. There is no reason why atheists cannot argue that values are discovered. For example, atheists such as Bertrand Russell in his early ethical writings argued that ?good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independent of our opinions just as much as round and square do.' Such qualities were discovered not created.
Now correlated to this affirmation is that somehow, intrinsic worth and a moral constitution supervene upon human beings through their having achieved a certain level of organismic complexity . According to David Brink, to whom Martin approvingly refers, this position is the most plausible position to take: "it is best for the [nontheistic] moral realist to claim that moral properties supervene upon physical properties."
So with this moral constitution, human beings have some inherent purpose, and therefore one ought to live one's life in a certain way (Says Martin: "Like Kant, I believe that one has a duty to fulfill one's talents.")
But if Martin's claim that there is "no cosmic purpose" is true, the relevant context for affirming a limited purpose is far from obvious. Martin moves from purposeless, impersonal, amoral, materialistic or naturalistic processes to? viol? !?the emergence of intrinsically-valuable, personal, moral beings. Again, I simply do not see that his worldview has the ontological resources to bring about this remarkable transformation. Within theism, on the other hand, there exists a continuity, a smooth transition of intrinsic dignity?from a maximally-great personal Being to valuable created persons?as opposed to the naturalistic shift from the nonmoral to the moral. This moral continuity ?the transference of moral properties from one moral Being to beings made in his image?has greater explanatory power than the disjunction between them on the naturalistic view. In the theistic view, moral properties have an ontological simplicity?as opposed to the naturalistic construal, in which moral properties are not ontologically simple.
Thus theists can take up Martin's challenge and offer a far more plausible basis for objective morality than the atheist can. We noted earlier Martin's argument ( AA-A ) against the theist who claims to have an objectivist ethic that the atheist does not have: In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail. But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail. Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily subjective.
On the epistemological level, Martin is rightly shocked by "Christian apologists"?whoever they may be?who claim that "atheists can provide no objective reason for not raping people." Theists and atheists alike can affirm the same moral principles as objectively true. But at the ontological level, it is the theistic apologist who is rightly shocked at Martin's claim. For Martin's worldview offers no obvious resources to affirm the uniqueness and dignity of the human being, individual human rights, personal responsibility, moral obligation, and the moral value of a cohesive social fabric. Thus, we can reply to Martin with the following syllogism (Theistic Argument B, or TA-B ): To ground an objective moral order, the atheist must show how naturalism furnishes an ontological framework for the intrinsic dignity of human beings, universal human rights, and moral responsibility. The atheist has shown no such ontological foundation (based on naturalism) to account for intrinsic human dignity, human rights, etc. Therefore, the atheist's attempt to ground an objective morality fails.
On the other hand, the theist (as we saw above) can make a plausible moral connection between God and human beings. It is this personal and moral connection which grounds the dignity/value, rights, purpose, and responsibility of human beings. It is only on this assumption ?at the ontological level?of humans' being intrinsically valuable that we can rise to the next level?the epistemological ?to know that rape, for instance, "violates the victim's rights . . . traumatizes the victim . . . undermines the fabric of society, and so on."
What we have before us is then is a matter of theism's greater contextual probability. Furthermore, there are certain additional facts about the world which are much more probable or make much more sense if God exists than if he does not: exist at all). "
Moreover, the theistic foundation for morality has the virtue of greater simplicity on its side in that it offers a plausible linking of two distinct entities that, in an atheistic world, must be joined in some ad hoc fashion. These two entities are objective moral values and human persons.
On the one hand, a metaphysical naturalist like Martin apparently presupposes that moral properties supervene on "correctly-related" or "complexly-conjoined" non-moral ones. Then somehow two apparently unconnected components within the universe?namely, (a) these emergent moral properties and (b) the moral principles of justice, mercy, and kindness, which are analytically-true brute givens whether or not any human beings exist?happen to be, by fantastic coincidence, intimately related. Now Martin holds that moral truths exist as part of the cosmic furniture, and he also maintains that humans (independent of these standards) evolved naturalistically to such a point at which they became moral beings.
But why think that these moral principles which exist even apply to us or morally obligate us? To say that moral values are "just there" seems insufficient. Isn't it an extraordinary coincidence that out of all possible creatures that have evolved, human beings should just happen to have obligations to these pre-existing, analytically-true objective moral values? It seems that the evolutionary process somehow anticipated the arrival of human beings on the scene. But a less ad hoc candidate is the theistic alternative. (And, we could add, even if moral properties did exist on a naturalistic scheme of things, why think that moral obligation exists?particularly when such a duty conflicts with my self-interest?)
Whereas these are two unconnected entities appear to pose a problem for the metaphysical naturalist, theism brings them together in a much more concise way: A personal God, who is the source of moral values, makes human persons in his image, and thus they share important moral and spiritual characteristics with God. Theism provides a match between our moral make-up and the structure of ultimate reality.
Thus objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe (despite Martin's claims to the contrary), objective morality?along with its assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral responsibility?is unnatural and surprising and "queer."

Nature and Convention, What's the Difference!

When it comes to morality the question that is usual asked is “what is true morality”? What is true goodness, true justice and who defines it or how do we even discover it are the questions that must be answered. For atheist’s who believe in a godless universe the concepts of absolute good and evil, right wrong become very hard to define. If one is seeking to find “what is’ and not what some one thinks “ought to be the case” one must study nature. For nature is “what is” it can not be any other way. For the atheist humans have a nature, that is not corrupted or immoral. It acts according to its nature. Our nature has desires and we act on them. Good and Evil are not exactly the products of the will, but they are the reflection of it. The will is blind and can not give us a rational justification for the ultimate ends that we pursue. If one wants to be a true atheist and live according to true morality, then he must live according to nature, which is what “is”. All actions are right as they reflect our nature to desire. If we want an objective standard that reflects a godless universe that has nothing to do with human edict, customs and rules, that is in no sense fabricated or dependent on what anyone says or does. Then we must seek “nature”. The laws of nature are not things that are so because someone has decreed that they should be so, or because people have become accustomed to so regarding them. They are so everywhere, no matter what anyone might think or do. They are not relative, then, to customs, laws, opinions, or conventions. For they are true by nature.

Do atheists want to live according to their “true” morality, that being “anything goes”. The law of nature is basically the law of anarchy. Rape, murder, lust, greed is all part of our nature. This is what our nature desires. Nature also does not show us that all humans are created equal. If one wants to keep to “true’ morality then the idea of human rights becomes an illusion. We are in fact suppressing individual rights to do what they want.

If atheist can’t accept this view of morality then the other option is convention morality. This view enters the realm of relative opinion, no view is better or worse than another just different, and any of them could change over time. In this view morality of what is good is just an invention of people desires. They are clearly man made and could have been other wise. The question must still be asked about conventions, do they correspond with what is right? In the end the idea of goodness becomes an empty concept corresponding to nothing absolute. So how is an atheist to talk about true morality? When both nature and convention can justify any act. What is the definition of an immoral behavior? Are there no actions that we consider absolutely wrong apart from opinions, which destroys the power of the obligation to summit to any rule. The problem with the atheist is that a godless universe is goodness free and evil free world. Humans are not created inherently good nor are they struggling with a sinful nature that is acting against the way it should act. It just seems that atheist cant get away from a moral universe. Our minds just know deep down that something’s are wrong no matter what people views are on it. That some of our actions are wrong, but this implies that we have a corrupt nature fallen from some absolute objective standard of goodness.

Goodness is meaningless without God

Have you ever asked your self “what is the good life”. What is a good person and what is the standard of goodness.

What is a good person? The answer comes forth at once, A good person is one who performs efficiently or well the function of a human being. And this at once invites the further question “What is the function of a human being? Now this question is not asking what is the function of this or that person, but what is the function of a person, just as a human being might be.

Now if humans are not created for a correct function then it is nonsense to talk about people doing good and evil. It is also nonsense to say that humans are inherently good, as this implies they have been created good or to act good, which implies they have been created according to a moral absolute standard that transcends them. If evolution is true then humans have no correct function and the idea of acting good is meaningless. All humans are, are machines who struggle over desires. If humans are not inherently good and created in the image of God with a moral law written on their hearts, reason driven by blind will has no hope in finding what goodness is in itself. It becomes an empty concept almost like an illness in the mind. The fact of morality and the clear awareness that human’s are inherently good but struggle to obtain this good I believe demonstrates the existence of good, evil and sin in the context of being creatures of God created to function good. Darwinism does not give us a rational defense for the existence of good and evil, right and wrong.

The Noble Lie

The dilemma of modern man is thus truly terrible. And insofar as he denies the existence of God and the objectivity of value and purpose, this dilemma remains unrelieved for “post-modern” man as well. Indeed, it is precisely the awareness that modernism issues inevitably in absurdity and despair that constitutes the anguish of post-modernism. In some respects, post-modernism just is the awareness of the bankruptcy of modernity. The atheistic world view is insufficient to maintain a happy and consistent life. Man cannot live consistently and happily as though life were ultimately without meaning, value, or purpose. If we try to live consistently within the atheistic world view, we shall find ourselves profoundly unhappy. If instead we manage to live happily, it is only by giving the lie to our world view.
Confronted with this dilemma, man flounders pathetically for some means of escape. In a remarkable address to the American Academy for the Advancement of Science in 1991, Dr. L. D. Rue, confronted with the predicament of modern man, boldly advocated that we deceive ourselves by means of some “Noble Lie” into thinking that we and the universe still have value. Claiming that “The lesson of the past two centuries is that intellectual and moral relativism is profoundly the case,” Dr. Rue muses that the consequence of such a realization is that one’s quest for personal wholeness (or self-fulfillment) and the quest for social coherence become independent from one another. This is because on the view of relativism the search for self-fulfillment becomes radically privatized: each person chooses his own set of values and meaning. “There is no final, objective reading on the world or the self. There is no universal vocabulary for integrating cosmology and morality.” If we are to avoid “the madhouse option,” where self-fulfillment is pursued regardless of social coherence, and “the totalitarian option,” where social coherence is imposed at the expense of personal wholeness, then we have no choice but to embrace some Noble Lie that will inspire us to live beyond selfish interests and so achieve social coherence. A Noble Lie “is one that deceives us, tricks us, compels us beyond self-interest, beyond ego, beyond family, nation, [and] race.” It is a lie, because it tells us that the universe is infused with value (which is a great fiction), because it makes a claim to universal truth (when there is none), and because it tells me not to live for self-interest (which is evidently false). “But without such lies, we cannot live.”

This is the dreadful verdict pronounced over modern man. In order to survive, he must live in self-deception. But even the Noble Lie option is in the end unworkable. For if what I have said thus far is correct, belief in a Noble Lie would not only be necessary to achieve social coherence and personal wholeness for the masses, but it would also be necessary to achieve one’s own personal wholeness. For one cannot live happily and consistently on an atheistic world view. In order to be happy, one must believe in objective meaning, value, and purpose. But how can one believe in those Noble Lies while at the same time believing in atheism and relativism? The more convinced you are of the necessity of a Noble Lie, the less you are able to believe in it. Like a placebo, a Noble Lie works only on those who believe it is the truth. Once we have seen through the fiction, then the Lie has lost its power over us. Thus, ironically, the Noble Lie cannot solve the human predicament for anyone who has come to see that predicament.

The Noble Lie option therefore leads at best to a society in which an elitist group of illuminati deceive the masses for their own good by perpetuating the Noble Lie. But then why should those of us who are enlightened follow the masses in their deception? Why should we sacrifice self-interest for a fiction? If the great lesson of the past two centuries is moral and intellectual relativism, then why (if we could) pretend that we do not know this truth and live a lie instead? If one answers, “for the sake of social coherence,” one may legitimately ask why I should sacrifice my self-interest for the sake of social coherence? The only answer the relativist can give is that social coherence is in my self-interest–but the problem with this answer is that self-interest and the interest of the herd do not always coincide. Besides, if (out of self-interest) I do care about social coherence, the totalitarian option is always open to me: forget the Noble Lie and maintain social coherence (as well as my self-fulfillment) at the expense of the personal wholeness of the masses. Generations of Soviet leaders who extolled proletarian virtues while they rode in limousines and dined on caviar in their country dachas found this alternative quite workable. Rue would undoubtedly regard such an option as repugnant. But therein lies the rub. Rue’s dilemma is that he obviously values deeply both social coherence and personal wholeness for their own sakes; in other words, they are objective values, which according to his philosophy do not exist. He has already leapt to the upper story. The Noble Lie option thus affirms what it denies and so refutes itself.

Can we live in a Multi-Meaning Universe

The past few days I have been searching on the web for books and articles which give a defense from the Atheist side on weather one can create his own meaning for life. I have already in my writings said why I believe it is not possible, but I would like to reflect here more on if it would even be livable if we did.

After reading some of the top Atheist Philosophers works on the web, for example Michael Martin and other articles, I did not find them to be very convincing. For an atheist there is no external meaning for the universe. The universe as a whole is meaningless. But the Atheist still believes that this does not mean that they cannot live a meaningful life. For them “meaning” means what is valuable to them, the individual.
One is free to live out ones desires as they please if it is valuable to them. To state that one can create his own meaning implies that there is no objective standard of meaning. Know ones view is better than another or more meaningful than another.
If this was to be the case then,

If Man can create his own meaning, then there is no difference between the beliefs of the sane or insane person, because all choices are based on what satisfies the “self”. What is meaningful to one can be meaningless to another. If meaning and meaningless can not be distinguished, is there such a thing as meaning. In the end meaning seems to be reduce to what “is”. This is the way the world just “is”. Describing what we see in the world of actions doesn’t really tell us much about meaning.

If we are to live out our own inventions, how are we to live in a society where we all get on. How is the Muslim and the Christian to get on, the Saint and the rapist, the molester and the children. I mean if meaning is reduced to what satisfies “me’ who is to condemn any ones choice. Or do we now have a majority vote, who imposes their purposes on the rest defining to the rest what is acceptable and what is not. Does meaning in the end come down to who can will his power over the masses. If this is true then know one can condemn Hitler or any other genocide country for what they did as it satisfied the majority, was valuable to them. To imply that common sense knows what is correct and meaningful is to assert that there is an objective purpose, and external purpose for human beings to live by where there is one goal to life, using many different roles and positions to accomplish that one goal. Many try and say we can all do what we like as long as we don’t hurt any body else, but that fails as it still imposes an objective standard on everybody else. Michael Martin with his view of the “Idea observer theory” is just that his theory. It’s not objective and why should the world follow his desires.

Atheism fails to give a workable answer to the meaning of life because it does not have a universal standard for meaning. This implies God’s standard and his objective obligation to all humans to obey. Humans are not meaningless objects, they have a correct way to function and a correct way to act and a correct purpose to accomplish on earth. It is not possible to live in a self seeking multi-meaning chaotic world of choices and opposing actions. Creations must act according to how they were made to function and for the ends they were purposed for. In my next post’s I will try and define what is our purpose on earth!

Meaning and Universal Concepts

In my last post I said that a key to the meaning of life might lie in our universal concepts that exist in our minds, which we do not invent. Some people may think we do but as was shown we can not make meaning out of raw will alone.
We need to ask the question “where do universals come from”, like the concepts of justice, beauty, good and evil, squares and shapes, values and relationships. Are they just random concepts that have evolved some how by chance to manifest themselves in our minds, or are they like Plato’s forms which live in another realm. Could they not be universal concepts from the mind of God to guide our thinking?
Would it be meaningful if we said that these universal principles and concepts are just there in our head by random chance. I mean do random abstract concepts prove anything? Why should I even take note of them when I can’t even see them and what makes them more worthy than other ideas such as fairies and unicorns. If chance is the reason for their existence then there is no foundation for them. We can use them but what is their worth?

What about Plato’s forms, which exist in another realm, does this explain where universal concepts come from and how they relate to the objective world. I would say the idea is more rational then chance, but the philosophy of the forms still has its weaknesses.
For Plato the forms are just ideas that exist in an eternal realm. These ideas are just floating in an eternal realm. But ideas floating around does not explain how they relate to each other or how one idea’ fits in context with another rationally. Ideas and concepts usually exist in a rational mind. For most people the idea of a realm of universal forms or concepts which we some how can have access to is a fantasy based in nonsense.
Aristotle tried to make it more rational by saying that the objects in the world had the concepts impose in them already and when we think on them we abstract the concepts out of them. But this is still nonsense as how can we see a concept in a material object.

Before I explain the third view, we must decide what our options are. Science would love to be play the reductionism game and tell us that this is just the way the universe is. Our minds have universal concepts, not wanting to think about their existence and foundation from chance. But even if true it does not solve the problem of their worth and meaning. For me I will never accept that meaning can come from an irrational source. As for Plato’s view there is no unity in the system or rational reason for ideas to be floating in another realm. So what is left,

The third view is that universal concepts and ideas, which give us a foundation for meaningful thoughts with contents, are grounded in man being created in the image of God. The universal concepts are the eternal concepts of Gods’ mind imposed in our mind to find connection with the material world. God’s interpretation of reality has been imposed into our minds on a finite level. These random concepts are in fact part of a rational unit of truth held in God’s mind. Because God has interpret the whole of reality according to his plan and will the universe is full of purpose and meaning. Our ideas correspond to God’s interpretation and guide us to find realties ultimate meaning and purpose. Therefore we have rational world where man can have a rational foundation for his thoughts and concepts of which they also correspond to objects in a meaningful way.

Meaning and "Man is the measure of all things"

Once one has rejected the idea that God exist and reality as a whole has know eternal interpretation. Man is left in a world lost in the void of nothingness. But can we create meaning up for ourselves. I believe this is not possible. The philosopher Protagoras once said, “Man is the measure of all things”. This implies that man has the power to generate meaning for all things.
But this is clearly false.

Cottingham in his book “The Meaning of Life” says of this view,

“Man, said the philosopher Protagoras, is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. Socrates had little trouble refuting that piece of pretentiousness. Pretentious it is, in its arrogance; the Psalmist’s cry ‘It is he that hath made us and not we ourselves’. Whatever one may think of the underlying creed, at least has the humility to acknowledge the basic truth that we exist in the universe as wholly contingent beings, dependent on a reality we did not create…We create our theories, certainly, but we can only delay, never ultimately prevent, their collapes when they fail to measure up to the bar of actual experience.”(Cottingham, The meaning of Life, p. 16)

Cottingham says that we do not invent meaning, we discover that we have meaning in our minds because reality has it. Man is not the measure of all things. To a point, reality is the measure of man. Man can only have and be what he has been created to be, wither this is from God or evolution. Yes we may use our meaning to describe a path we have chosen for life, but this does not explain where conciseness meaning comes from!. And our chosen paths are not based in a vacuum where we can create totally our own life and its meaning, as we are a part of reality and society which interferes and places us in its reality messing our chosen plans up.

Nietzsche was another philosopher who thought one could invent meaning from within. Cottinghams writes,

“How does Nietzsche’s heroic attempt to generate meaning from within? By supposing the unaided human will can create meaning, that it can merely by its own resolute affirmation bypass the search for objectively sourced truth and value, he seems to risk coming close to the Protagorean fallacy. For meaning and worth cannot reside in raw will alone; they have to involve a fit between our decisions and beliefs and what grounds those decisions and beliefs. That grounding may, as some religious thinkers maintain, be divinely generated; or it may be based on something else for example certain fundamental facts about our social or biological nature. But it cannot be created by human fait alone.”(Cottingham, The Meaning of Life, p. 17)

I don’t believe it is possible to create meaning from raw will alone. For any goal that we have must be placed in some context of reality to understand our concepts. To start of with the idea of concepts assumes that our thoughts and concepts are meaningful and correspond to some universal ideas, or our thoughts would be empty. If our thoughts and concepts do not have any objective relationship to anything how are we to understand the meaning of our concepts. The point is we do not invent meaning, we reflect that we have a mind of meaningful thoughts that think with universal concepts, which we have some understanding off. If there is no overarching structure or theory that confers meaning on life, no normative pattern or model to which life must conform, then a meaningful life is meaningless. It is true we can create a life that fulfils what we want in a sense, but this does not explain what is the meaning of life, or why we believe any of the beliefs we hold. Is right and wrong and evil just an invention, is suffering meaningless. Is there any objective reason why we should live, is living any more valuable then dying. I believe the evidence that we have universal concepts and ideas is the key to leading us in to the direction of the meaning of life.

If that vast blank emptiness, aptly named “Space” is all the home we have, then our journey, a journey out of nothing and towards nothing, risks appearing futile, as void of significance as the ultimate void that spawned us and will eventually swallow us up.

Science and Meaning

Science starts off with a dogma “that all that can exist is the material world of matter” running by cause and effects. Its philosophy is to look at the material world and describe what it “is”. But in explaining what “is” the scientist is not telling us “why” things work like they do and for what purpose or reason they exist. For the scientist is interested only with casual effects. While science claims to provide as complete and comprehensive a description as it can of the universe, no matter how successful and unified the theory it ends up with, it cannot explain why there should be a universe there to be explained. We collide with the ancient philosophical question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ and it seems clear on reflection that nothing within the observable universe could really answer this. If there is a solution to the riddle of life in space and time, it would have to lie outside space and time. This world implies a Transcendent Creator (God) who has created all reality according to a plan and purpose full of design.

But Science with it reductionism, believes that the world as a whole is meaningless, irrational, but is committed in discovering knowledge about its invisible structure. Science is committed to observation only of the material world with it imposed theories. By seeking to explain every event by its simplest material causes one has reduced the universe to a law like machine. If the universe exists by chance and is evolving by random chance then the whole machine of reality is determined by chance. Man in the end is reduced to irrational forces. Mind is reduced to chemical reaction and the neutralizing solvent of a wholly materialistic physics. Along with mind, of course, the scientific mind also dissolved free will, moral values, motivations, ideologies, politics, the soul, and meaningful ends, as each was in turn reduced to indifferent mechanistic causes.
The great truth about this theory is that the more humankind gained the ability to predict and control nature, to understand its causes and to separate from its necessities, the more it was submerged into nature and became a determinant product of its meaningless mechanistic forces.

So how are we to find meaning in a world that is indifferent, a purposeless universe of material causes that operate according to the machine like laws of nature, and that is alien to human values and aspirations? How do we make meaningful choices when choice is reduced to biological chance acts. For in this world there is no objective standard to follow or even judge our choices by.
Science can describe what it “sees”, but it cant tell us why and for what aim or purpose the act is for as reality as a whole has no meaning. One example could be, we see suffering, it just “is”. Its not a problem, its not wrong or right, the world hasn’t fallen from a universal standard (God’s law). It just is and the question of “should” we help people who suffer is a meaningless question for science? It can only describe material causes not reasons why. The universe has no intrinsic meaning, direction, end or purpose.

Bertrand Russell; That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the out come of accidental collocations of atoms that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave. That all the labors of the ages, all the devotion all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must be inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins. Only within the scaffolding of these truth, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.

Friedrich Nietzsche; reason is a tool for desire, a tool that can only clarify the stark choices facing all humans. Reason cannot be objective and that in the end all morality and truth are arbitrary. Since every argument must begin with premises that cannot be supported. The original foundation of every argument is merely suspended in air. First principles are simply and only arbitrary choices, if they are indeed the principles upon which all other principles stand. In this regard, first principles cannot be reasonable or rational, if they are genuine first principles. For there would be no principles prior to first principles by which to judge whether the first principles satisfied them as reasonable…It is the intuition that man creates the world, rather than discovers a world in which meaning is fixed. Humans do not find truth but make truth.

Sam Harris; We live in a world where all things, good and bad, are finally destroyed by change. Parents lose their children and children their parents. Husbands and wives are separated in an instant, never to meet again. Friends part company in haste, without knowing that it will be for the last time. This life, when surveyed with a broad glance, presents little more than a vast spectacle of loss…Only the atheist realizes…how unfortunate it is that millions of human beings suffer the most harrowing abridgements of their happiness for no good reason at all…many human beings suffer needlessly while alive.”
Science does not solve the problem of the meaning of life…

Talking about what "is" based on what? and for what purpose or reason, of which there is none, does not help us find meaning to our lives.

The "Why" questions?

What are we really asking when we ask about the meaning of life? Partly, it seems we are talking about our relationship with the rest of the universe, who we are and how we came to be here. It seeks for a rational reason to our existence.
The question “What is the meaning of life” opens the doors to asking any of the following inquiries,

1.Why does the universe exist
2.Why is there something rather than nothing? Is there some plan for the universe?
3.Why do humans exist? Do they exist for some purpose? If so, what is it?
4.Why do I exist? Do I exist for some purpose? If so, how am I to find what it is? If not, how can life have any significance or value?
5. Can we create our own meaning?
6. Is there any purpose in suffering and Pain.
7. Is it life worth living?

Meaning looks for a reference beyond itself and is I believe in impossible without an eternal interpretation to reality. Meaning is a concept that can only be grasped by the intellect. Some people believe that you can create your own meaning and purpose for life, but I will show latter why I believe this is not possible.
For now it is sufficient to say that whenever a culture fails to supply an answer to the meaning of life and questions of what we should believe and why we should believe them, no action seems justifiable. The question “Why’ does not give us a convincing answer. As a result all actions and beliefs seem arbitrary or subjective. There are no answers, only choices. Choices are instrumental acts to achieve meaningful ends, but when those ends lack justification, choice is arbitrary and meaningless. In a world without meaning, choice is a futile gesture.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith; The intellectual problem of the modern world is how to be a relativist without being a nihilist.

Richard Tarnas; Our psychological and spiritual predisposition’s are absurdly at variance with the world revealed by our scientific method. We seem to receive two messages from our existential situation; on the one hand, strive give one self to the quest for meaning and spiritual fulfillment, but on the other hand, know that the universe of whose substance we are derived is entirely indifferent to that quest, soulless in character, and nullifying in its effects. We are once aroused and crushed. For inexplicably absurdly, the Cosmo is inhuman, yet we are not. The situation is profoundly unintelligent.

For how is one to find meaning is a meaningless universe? How does one find his place in an impersonal irrational random universe, with no purpose or reason for anything or its reactions!

The problem with science is that it looks at the “How” questions instead of the why questions. To tell us what “is’ does not help us in finding why it should be. To look at a world and not even know if your thoughts are meaningful is to fall into disappear. To see a world that just “is’ with no explanation is to leave us in our insanity.

Finding the meaning of life!

Does life have meaning? Before the question is asked, we live in a state of innocence. But once the question becomes a question, once we ask whether life is meaningful, there is no turning back. The possibility that life may be pointless leaves us naked and vulnerable. All of us seek a life of meaning and purpose, but finding such a life is difficult.
For what does the question even mean? Is the question even meaningful? And to what does it correspond to? It is this question that I will be looking at in my next posts.