The Euthyphro Argument fails!

When it comes to establishing absolute moral standards in God, atheist continue to use the Euthuphro argument to try and trap God and discredit his standard for goodness. The Euthyphro dilemma raised by Socrates was: "Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" Atheist are quick to see that if what is good is based on what God commands then anything that God commands even if it was rape would by logic be good. So atheist imply that for god to be good there must be an independent moral standard of “Goodness” that judges God actions.

John Frame says in his book “The Doctrine of God”

“So Plato, in Euthyphro, poses the question of whether piety is what the gods say it is, or whether the gods command piety because of its intrinsic nature, apart from their own wishes. In Plato’s mind, the former makes the nature of piety arbitrary, one that could change on the whim of a god. But the second alternative, which Plato certainly prefers, means that piety is independent of the will of the gods, something to which the gods opinions are subject.”

Atheists like this so called trap because to stop God having relative standards there must be an eternal abstract standard that judges God’s acts. They like it because even if there were no God, there would still be an objective standard by which atheists can establish objective morality.

The Atheist Philosopher Michael Martin says,

“For example, suppose God condemns rape because of his just and merciful character. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and action based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.”

So Martin wonders why the non-existence of God would adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice.
The problem with this argument is that ‘goodness” is not based on what ever God says. Goodness is the eternal nature of God and God is bound by his perfect nature to act “good”. God would not command people to rape or torture people because it is against his perfect nature. If God is the eternal uncaused cause of everything else that exist then he is the eternal source for moral goodness, which everything else takes its existence from.

Paul Copan makes a good point when he says,

“The "reasons" Martin offers for why rape is wrong already assume the dignity of human beings, the existence of universal human rights, an objective purpose/end for human existence, moral obligation, and moral responsibility. Thus Martin needs to offer a more robust explanation for these assumptions, but we have seen that the atheistic worldview lacks such resources while the theistic perspective anticipates a moral universe.”

In fact the very argument can be reversed back on to the atheist, for if objective moral properties just exist out in the universe independent of humans , then are they good because they are good or is there some independent standard of good to which they conform?" Thus the alleged dilemma Martin claims the theist faces is the very same one the atheist does. So there is no actual advantage for the atheist in presenting this challenge. The same potential charges of arbitrariness or the existence of some autonomous moral standard (such as platonic Forms) still apply. If the atheist claims that he is not being arbitrary, then why should the theist's viewpoint be considered any less arbitrary? The sword cuts both ways. It is more intelligence to place moral laws existence in a perfect moral being, then floating in impersonal irrational matter/Atoms independent of a mind.

Paul Copan concludes with,

“The theist has a plausible basis for this: human beings have value by virtue of their personhood, which is derived from the personhood of God? The ultimately valuable Being. Having been created in the image of God gives human beings their value. Their nature?with its moral, rational, and spiritual capacities? resemble God's. So to assume morality without God seems to miss the ontological implications of the question. That is, if there is no personal God to bestow personhood? And its attendant intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility, then we can't rightly say, "I can be a person with intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility even if God doesn't exist."

The Euthyphro argument should be dead now, but atheist keep using it over and over again.